

OSS FORM 102

SECRET

FROM:

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

Accession No.

Date Rec'd SA

Date of Report

To	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	End'd		
1.	127K	22/1	22/1	Ø	No dissemination Disseminated from cable (A-47528).
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FEB 25 1963
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OSO Registry
AUG 26 1948

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in To column.
A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.
Officer Designation should be used in To column.
Each Officer's Initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.
Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.
Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.
For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

REMINGTON RAND INC., BRIDGEPORT CONN., REM-MASTER 24/11

08-09

RESULTS

10

DATE OF INFORMATION as stated
PLACE OF ORIGIN Russia

NUMBER OF PAGES
ATTACHMENTS
THEATRE

7

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mediate audience with General Indeen. The latter was not located that night, and the conference took place the next afternoon. Vinogradov asked why Indeen had seen fit to attack the Russians in his statements. Indeen replied that he had done nothing more than state the truth, and that he deemed it his absolute duty to make clear the facts so that the record would show why Russia will be unable to discharge her Armistice obligations. Indeen further stated that if the Russians continue to take every the means of predation and to deny the means of transportation to Russia, there is no reason for any Russian government, and he himself would resign. Vinogradov then said that he believed the situation not to be so serious and that he would do all in his power to help solve the difficulties and assist General Indeen in every way possible. Even though Vinogradov knew that Indeen's statements had been broadcast on the radio, he requested Indeen not to permit the publication in the local press. Indeen connected to this and the statements have not appeared in print. Vinogradov subsequently implied that Indeen's statements had a friend. Indeen replied that he was certainly friendly toward Vinogradov but that he should be permitted to do his work. The two shook hands and went together to a Christian party given by General Dombrowsky, the Mayor of Bucharest.

9. Indeen stated to sub-source that he made the statements for the purpose of getting a strong Russian reaction. He further stated that if the result had been to cause his own resignation as Prime Minister he would have told the truth and put the facts on record; whereas if he should continue in office he would have concealed his position and have placed himself in a better position to obtain concrete data relative in his dealings with the Russians.

Comments: These developments are regarded as extremely significant and as containing indications that Russians wish to support Indeen's government. Communist elements have expressed the opinion that Vinogradov's request for suppression of statements was to avert a Government article, which might result in the fall of the present Indeen Government. The reason for the high evaluation of the foregoing information is that all the facts stated, with the exception of the reported conversation between Indeen and Vinogradov, have been corroborated by numerous independent sources.

Indeen
Indeen's statements of significance regarding the same general situation is the fact that Gheorghiu-Dea, Communist Minister of Communications, has departed for Moscow, where he will endeavor to negotiate the return of Russian railways to Russian management and operation.

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APPENDIX A

thanks to the spiritless of the inter-ministerial commission, in re-establishing normal conditions in Malawi. The innovations and improvisations of a troubled epoch should give way to the authority of the central government, the re-establishment of which, without restrictions or reservations upon our entire territory, is an essential condition, both for the fulfillment of the Armistice and for our war effort.

It is from the point of view of these same questions that we must consider equally the problem of industrial production, as well as that of the governmental party, a problem of primary importance and one which we are resolved to meet without flinching, without hesitation, and with all the energy demanded by the situation. Here, as elsewhere, we must have confidence in our government and not hinder it in its arduous task.

But in order that it may accomplish successfully this task, it is my duty to address myself equally to the Allies, beside whom we have fought and are fighting with all our strength, to assure the victory of justice and liberty. We have until now, and we shall continue to wage this fight without hesitation or reservations, in our confidence. It is necessary now to and I am fully confident that we receive from their side as well, all the support necessary. It must be established, without delay, the elementary conditions which are indispensable to the whole effort of the country. We know that upon this point we will do nothing without the cooperation of our Allies. At the present moment our cause is so linked to theirs that it must be realized that any failure of our arms or military capacity weakens them in the same measure. We should, therefore, begin, in 1945, to be the victors of 1944, and begin by doing that which we have been in readiness since 23 of August, the Armistice of a common victory. It is to this work that I have decided to concentrate all of the energy of which I am capable and all of the years which remain to me. I have had until now the greatest support on the part of His Majesty the King who entrusted to me this mission so burdened with responsibility. I count upon that of the political parties which have accorded me their confidence as Prime Minister, and I trust that I shall not lack the cooperation of the Allies - the salvation of the country depends on it entirely.

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APPENDIX B

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Recommendations Made to the Mass Press by the General Adjutant
Nicholas Rudakov, President of the Council of Ministers

At our first meeting, I expressed the opinion that an exchange of views, from time to time, between the Government and the Press can only be favorable to the smooth functioning of affairs. Thus, since the Press can be informed with precision and can pass on to the public completely truthful information, some misunderstandings or incorrect interpretations which might be given to certain facts can be avoided.

On the other hand, as to information, I must again call attention to the rapidity with which news, which has not at all been verified, is circulated. In the very course of this week news has been published which had to be modified the next day because it was based merely on rumors.

I told you in the interview we had at the time this Government took office that the two fundamental aims of this Government are the following:

On the one hand, the re-establishment of order and governmental authority with a view to eliminating the great difficulties which we must face; and on the other hand, local collaboration with our allies in all fields, and especially the closest rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

As to the first aim, I am glad to inform you that, owing to the measures which prevailed among the important elements of the present Government, satisfactory enough results have been achieved.

This, it is my duty to acknowledge, and is due to a great extent to the comprehension of which the workmen have given proof. I tender them my thanks for the readiness with which they have followed the advice given them.

I hope that after the promulgation of the Trade Union Law the disputes between management and labor will be completely eliminated. Entirely favorable results have been achieved in Maldiva, where the situation appeared to be very disquieting so far as the re-establishment of order and governmental authority is concerned.

As a result of the work there of an interministerial commission composed of delegates of all political groups participating in the Government, the problems could be fairly easily solved.

The chaos which seemed to extend to the whole province was only apparent, and can easily be explained. During nearly ten months, Maldiva was left to its own devices. Communication with the center was nearly completely severed, and there were great needs which no one thought of satisfying. For this reason every district improvised as best it could a local government which in some localities proved to be wholly inadequate. Under the circumstances, it was quite natural that the situation should be difficult and that tendentious rumors should flourish.

It was enough to show Maldiva that it had not been forgotten and to extend a fraternal hand in order to remedy the situation. Local authorities were set up, thanks to a complete agreement between the members of the commission and the local representatives of the people so that today the situation can be considered as nearly normal.

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APPENDIX B

*Introduction to Jose Marti by
Commander Adolfo L. Rodriguez*

In the first days of the coming year the entire administrative machinery will be installed, and the first steps to eliminate the most urgent needs will be taken.

The experience of Moldavia has been so useful and the results achieved so good, that we are convinced that it can be profitably applied also to the rest of the country, should any misunderstandings arise there.

I am sending now to the second important aim of our program collaboration with our Allies in general, and strengthening of our ties with the Soviet Union in particular.

In this respect, the result will depend in the first place on the fulfillment of the Armistice terms, to which I have unreservedly committed myself.

As I bear the responsibility of leadership, it is my duty not to conceal anything from the people.

I clearly stated at the moment I took office, and I repeat now, that we are, my colleagues and myself, struggling with the utmost determination to fulfill scrupulously the commitments we have assumed.

It happens, however, that our determination is not always on a par with the requirements of the situation.

In many cases, the potentialities of the country, seriously affected by the disaster into which we were unwillingly plunged, cannot equal our will and our strength. Therefore in order to be true to our word and not to be accused of bad will, we ask the Allies, to whom we are indebted, to show some understanding for our problems and to extend to us a helping hand, so that we may accomplish that which we earnestly desire to do.

The quantities of materials of every description which we are obliged to give and which we want to give with all our heart are in some instances so excessive that the whole production machinery is not permitted to function. All our efforts, all our struggles are futile, even if we reserve nothing for our own needs.

Our industry has always been insufficiently equipped for great production. Now then could we attain the output of the great quantities which are requested, if we must surrender a part of the already limited means of production in our possession?

The situation is such that it is impossible for me not to foresee, with a heavy heart, the moment when we will not be able to comply with the demands made upon us.

It seems to me that plain truth, as I put it, is always at our side.

It is not without reason that the government of our country is so much interested in the respect that the Allies will be unable to fulfill its commitments.

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